Moral Rules, Utilitarianism and Schizophrenic Moral Education by Mcdonough, Kevin
Journal ofPhilosophy of Education, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1992 75 
Moral Rules, Utilitarianism and 
Schizophrenic Moral Education 
KEVIN McDONOUGH 
ABSTRACT R. M. Hare has argued for and defended a ‘two-level’, view of moral agency. 
He argues that moral agents ought to rely on the rules of ‘intuitive moral thinking’for 
their ‘everyday’ moral judgments. When these rules conflict or when we do not have a 
rule at hand, we ought to ascend to the act-utilitarian, ‘critical’ level of moral thinking. I 
argue that since the rules at the intuitive level of moral thinking necessarily conflict 
much more often than Hare supposes, and since we often do not have ready-made rules 
for our moral judgments, we must necessarily use critical moral thinking very fie- 
quently. However, act-utilitarian judgements at this level will sharply conflict with our 
strongly held ‘intuitive’ moral convictions. I show that Hare’s attempt to balance these 
two aspects of moral judgment requires us to simultaneously adopt two conflicting sets 
of moral standards, and thus an attempt to inculcate such standards constitutes a 
‘schizophrenic’ moral education. Finally, I briefly outline an alternative conception of 
moral education, based on Aristotelian phronesis. 
Introduction 
In this paper I discuss the grievous consequences of a view of moral education based 
on a strong view of moral rules in moral agency. Joel.Kupperman has defended a view 
of moral education that would give a central role to the inculcation of strong 
‘inhibitions’ against breaking rules such as ‘Don’t tell lies’ (Kupperman, 1978). 
Kupperman argues that moral education has as one of its primary tasks the implanting 
of such rules and strong affective accompaniments to the rules, so that agents will not 
feel impelled to violate them, at least under normal circumstances. Thus, rules 
represent ongoing constraints on even mature moral agents. In this paper I will discuss 
and criticize a more sophisticated version of what I term the ‘strong view’ of moral 
rules. R. M. Hare has recently advocated (Hare 198 1) and vigorously defended (1 988 
a-d) a view of moral agency that requires agents to rely on ‘relatively simple prima 
facie principles’ (or PFP’s) for ‘everyday’ moral judgments. I argue that this view 
represents a naive oversimplification of moral agency. Since one important educa- 
tional implication of this view would be the inculcation of PFP’s, the view represents 
an objectionable moral miseducation. I briefly outline, at the end of the paper, a more 
desirable view of moral agency based on Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle considers rules to 
be like moral crutches. They are needed for agents to take their first halting moral 
steps, but are ultimately dispensable for agents who have developed mature moral 
judgement. Moral education, then, will seek to cultivate such judgment, or what 
Aristotle calls phronesis. 
The issue of moral rules is of obvious practical concern for educators. Rules might 
be thought to represent the goals, the content, of moral education. For example, 
people who habitually lie, steal, hurt others, neglect themselves, etc., are as obvious 
cases of moral failure as we can find. Children who adhere to rules against lying, etc., 
will not be moral failures in this sense. Nevertheless, lists of genera1 rules (e.g. ‘Don’t 
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tell lies’ ‘Don’t steal’ ‘Be nice to others’ etc.) inevitably neglect the complexity of moral 
life. Lies must sometimes be told. Justice may require that property rights be 
overridden. And it is not always best to be nice, even to one’s friends. 
These reflections point to an educational concern with children’s ability to make 
sophisticated moral judgments in a complex, rapidly changing world. The complexity 
of moral judgment is seen to arise from the interplay of two aspects of judgment. First, 
principles represent moral standards that are not simply personal. In ethical life, they 
are tools by which different agents can impartially determine the adequacy of judg- 
ments. However, we do not often expect principles to determine their own application. 
Sensitivity to the particularity of situations, including aspects particular to the indivi- 
dual agents involved or to the salient human relationships involved, is needed to 
determine how a principle is to be applied in any particular case. 
Some earlier conceptions of moral education have tended to turn a blind eye to 
the issue of moral judgment. For example, in the United States and Canada, the 
influential values clarification movement claimed to provide a procedure by which 
children can learn to determine their ‘real’ beliefs, and to act on those beliefs without 
internal conflict and with enthusiasm (Raths et al., 1978). This method is in large part 
a response to alleged dogmatism and rigidity of traditional views of moral education, 
but in responding to such dogmatism, values clarification has reduced moral education 
to the mere entrenchment of arbitrary personal preferences and desires. These prefe- 
rences cannot, for values clarifiers, be justified or condemned according to any 
interpersonal standards or criteria. Thus, a successful application of this method could 
generate ‘morally’ educated agents as diverse as Mother Teresa and Charles Manson. 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s views have similarly been widely criticized for allowing objec- 
tionable forms of moral relativism. Hare’s view offers a sophisticated, attractive, 
though ultimately seriously flawed, response to the weaknesses of views such as 
Kohlberg’s and that of values clarification. 
Hare’s is a ‘two-level’ view of moral thinking. The distinction between levels, he 
argues, provides a rational method for establishing the moral rules on which individu- 
als can justifiably rely for much of their everyday moral thinking. These moral rules, 
the application of which, for Hare, constitutes the ‘intuitive’ level of moral thinking, 
make up the moral ‘content’ for all individual moral agents. They exist at what Hare 
calls the level of intuitive moral thinking (IMT). These rules are constructed, revised 
and justified at the level of critical moral thinking (CMT), by a process of impartial 
evaluation of preferences. If Hare’s arguments for his two-level theory are persuasive, 
he has helped to resolve important weaknesses in previous accounts of moral educa- 
tion. First, since IMT contains the rules by which most of us will lead a large part of 
our moral lives, Hare avoids the objectionable radical moral relativism often thought 
to accompany Kohlberg’s approach and the values clarification approach. In addition, 
educators will have a relatively clear idea of the most appropriate moral educational 
aims, since children will need to learn to obey the rules when that is necessary. 
Furthermore, since the rules are impartially justified by CMT, Hare’s view seemingly 
avoids charges of moral dogmatism. And, to the extent that one of the educational 
goals of Hare’s view is to cultivate an ability to do CMT when that is appropriate, the 
rules are not imposed in an authoritarian way. After agents achieve competency in 
CMT, they will be able to select, revise, and suit moral judgments to their particular 
circumstances when that is necessary. 
In what follows I argue that the alleged advantages of Hare’s view are illusory and 
that his view of moral thinking itself constitutes a grievous moral miseducation. Hare 
has recently re-affirmed the primacy of IMT in our everyday judgments, since “moral 
decision-making by humans in the face of real-life risk and uncertainty. . . should 
normally be done at the intuitive level” (Hare, 1988b, p. 241). He even goes so far as 
to suggest that the archangel-his representative of CMT, and who is also a “wise act- 
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utilitarian” (Hare 1981, p. 38)-is not relevant for studying this kind of ‘real-life’ 
moral thinking, but only as a “device for studying critical thinking” (1988b, p. 241). 
Thus, CMT is to be used rarely, or never, at least by humans, for reasons to be 
explained below. Our moral character, then, is largely constituted by the rules we hold 
at the intuitive level and our allegiance in adhering to them. At this level, the rules 
provide a determinate method for judging right acts. However, as I will argue, the 
complexity of moral life makes this view of moral judgment grossly oversimplified. 
Our moral rules will necessarily often conflict, or will not serve for novel or unusual 
moral cases. For Hare there is no further method of judgment at the level of IMT. 
Thus, on his view, in cases where our rules conflict or where we have no rules, we are 
forced to resort to act-utilitarian CMT. If, in fact, CMT must be used more often than 
Hare usually indicates, I argue that his view of moral judgment suffers from common 
and crippling objections made against act-utilitarian theories. Thus, Hare is faced with 
a dilemma. On one horn of the dilemma moral judgment (on his view) is largely a 
matter of applying rules, in which case it fails to account for the complexity of human 
judgment. On the other horn, moral judgment represents an abhorrent act-utilitarian 
ideal. The apparent advantages of this view for moral education are thus illusory. I 
argue that a moral education based on Hare’s two-level theory would induce a 
paralyzing ‘moral schizophrenia’ since in complex moral cases, the standards of the 
intuitive level inevitably conflict, in a psychologically debilitating way, with those at 
the critical level. Hare offers no way for agents to resolve this conflict. 
Intuitive Moral Thinking: Hare’s strong view of moral rules 
In the latest development of his universal-prescriptivist theory, Hare has claimed that 
he provides a ‘two-level’ structure and determinate method of moral thinking that is 
tantamount to what a ‘wise act-utilitarian’ would use (1981, p. 38). The theory is 
allegedly impervious to ‘vulgar objections’ often made against act-utilitarianism since 
our strongest common sense moral judgments cannot, except in extremely unusual 
circumstances, be sacrificed, as with other versions of utilitarianism, in favour of 
utility maximizing judgments. 
Hare claims that we can rely on a set of relatively simple, general principles for 
most cases in which moral judgment is required. These are represented at the lower 
level of IMT. Furthermore, these rules must be strongly held. Violating them must 
induce in us a strong feeling of ‘compunction’ (Hare 1981, p. 29). Hare says that we 
can “[rely] in much of our moral thinking on relatively general principles” (1 98 1, p. 
38) and that we ought to have “intuitions and dispositions firmly built into our 
characters and motivations” (1981, p. 38). He prefers to call these “prima facie 
principles” (PFP’s). In order for agents best to deal with the complexities of the moral 
world, Hare advocates 
the formation in ourselves of relatively simple reaction-patterns (whose 
expression in words, if they had one, would be relatively simple prescriptive 
principles) which prepare us to meet new contingencies resembling in their 
important features contingencies in which we have found ourselves in the 
past (1981, p. 36). 
At least most of us are then, most of the time, ‘proles’ (Hare 1981, passim) in our 
moral thinking. We have a determinate ‘method‘ of right moral judgement at this 
level, i.e. the application of rules. 
At the upper, act-utilitarian level of moral thinking, agents engage in CMT. One 
task of CMT is to impartially determine the ‘right’ act in particular situations. This 
method bypasses the substantive moral intuitions, represented by our internalized 
‘reaction patterns’, etc. It proceeds instead “in accordance with canons established by 
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philosophical logic and [is] thus based on linguistic intuitions only” (Hare, 1981, p. 
40). For Hare these linguistic intuitions are represented by the linguistic properties 
and logical canons of prescriptivity, universalizability and overridability. This trio, 
taken jointly, is uniquely characteristic of words used in moral discourse. CMT also 
has the pre-educative role of justifying and selecting the rules which we shall be wise to 
internalize at the intuitive level, and apply in our everyday moral judgments. In other 
words, the critical moral educator or policy maker has to design a code of rules which 
will provide the blueprint for childrens’ moral education. This is needed because, for 
Hare, the intuitive thinking that we normally apply in our everyday lives will be a 
matter of applying these rules. 
It is important to see that, for Hare, these two levels of moral thinking, and the 
methods appropriate to each, are sharply distinct. The human critical thinker selects 
principles for use at the intuitive level, “on the score of their acceptance utility, i.e. on 
the ground that they are the set of principles whose general acceptance in the society in 
question will do the best, all told, for the interests of the people in the society 
considered impartially” (Hare, 198 1, p. 156). He suggests that only an archangel could 
do this selecting perfectly. However, as humans using the critical method, with the aid, 
for example, of our ancestors’ critical thinking, we can work out some approximation 
of the archangelic ideal. The point is that what principles we shall desirably hold is 
decided at the level of critical thinking, while intuitive thinking is based on our 
accepting those principles in a strong (uncritical) way. 
The ‘complete separation’ of the two levels (Hare, 198 1, p. 32) is made sharper by 
the two senses of ‘right’ that Hare claims characterize judgments at each level. The act- 
utilitarian archangelic judgments of the critical level constitute the ‘definitively’ right 
judgment in any particular case. These may occasionally override our intuitive 
judgments, but CMT requires an immense and daunting knowledge of facts and logic. 
Thus, it is usually reserved for a ‘cool hour’ in which one has time to collect the facts, 
and, in light of those facts, to consider different options carefully. However, intuitive 
judgments are also ‘right’ in one sense, i.e.for the purpose which they are intended to 
serve. They are ‘prima facie’ right insofar as the critical thinking that selects them for 
use has been competently done. Moral education, on Hare’s view, will involve learning 
to ignore, in situations in which it is fitting, the judgments made at the critical level. 
Moral education will also seek to develop competent critical thinkers so that we can 
employ such thinking when that is fitting. We become educated, then, to perform 
much like well trained tennis players. Tennis players react instinctively to the exigen- 
cies of the game as it progresses, but they also analyze their shots and movements 
more reflectively while watching them leisurely on videotape. Both kinds of thinking 
have their place for the moral thinker as for the tennis player, but clearly any attempt 
to use one level of thinking in improper situations will yield disastrous results. Hare 
argues that, for various reasons, humans usually ought to eschew the methods of the 
critical level in favor of the rules of the intuitive level. Why? Hare gives two general 
reasons. First, we rarely have the time or ability to analyze particular exigencies. 
Attempts to do so in such cases would be foolish, and would likely lead to botched 
moral judgements. As in any complex practice we need simplifying guides to help us. 
Secondly, due to human weaknesses such as partiality to self, critical thinking is wisely 
reserved for those situations in which one is detached enough not to be tempted to 
‘cook’ one’s principles in one’s own favor. Like good tennis players, then, we will 
normally rely on the best set of ‘rules of good play’ (1 98 1, p. 38). This set will be the 
set that, if followed, gives us “the best chance of acting rightly [even though the 
principles making up this set] are not definitive of the ‘right act’ on an act-utilitarian 
analysis” (1 98 1, p. 38). 
Is this a desirable picture of moral judgment? I think not. Hare is right to stress 
the importance of the simplicity and generality of rules, or what he calls ‘prima facie 
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principles’ (or PFP’s), in the moral education of young children (1981, p. 35-36). 
Simplicity and generality are important for the psychological reason that it would be 
extremely dif’ficult for very young children to learn complex principles in such a way 
that they could be competently applied. Also, by remaining general, PFP’s allow 
children to learn to pick out the morally relevant features of a “variety of situations all 
of which have certain salient features in common” (ibid.). However, as a representa- 
tion of anything approaching mature moral judgment, this model, i.e. a model based 
on relatively simple, general principles, constitutes a gross oversimplification. 
Conflicts of Principle and Moral Judgment 
Why is it an oversimplification? Let us consider cases of moral conflict that Hare 
describes as “situations in which we seem to have conflicting duties” (1981, p. 26), or 
“conflicting [prima facie] principles” (1 98 1, p. 32) or, what amounts to the same thing 
for Hare, “conflicts between intuitions” (1981, p. 32). Suppose, for example, as Hare 
does, that a good, long-time friend shows up unexpectedly, just for the day, and wishes 
to be shown around town. I have already promised my family that I will picnic with 
them today. I cannot fulfil both ‘duties’. How shall I decide what to do? (1981, p. 28). 
For Hare there are two clear options. Either there is in fact no conflict, in which case I 
simply apply a relevant rule. Or else there is in fact a conflict and I resolve the conflict 
using act-utilitarian CMT. Other options, such as making our rules more complex, or 
having higher order intuitive moral principles, are inadequate, as Hare himself points 
out. Such procedures lead to a process of lengthening our rules and making them more 
complex that soon gets absurdly out of hand (1981, p. 32-34). Such rules will be 
impossible for children-or adults-to learn; and they will be useless as guides to 
future conduct. Furthermore, any sort of indeterminate ‘judging or weighing’ process 
is immediately dismissed by Hare (Hare, 1981, p. 34) [l]. Indeterminacy in itself is 
necessarily enough for such a process to be deemed irrational and arbitrary for Hare. 
If we accept Hare’s description of this simple case as one of conflicting moral 
rules, then obviously, contrary to his claims, we are going to need to use CMT very 
often to resolve conflicts like this. We then need to evaluate CMT more closely, as I do 
below. However, the most striking thing about Hare’s example is that, as J. 0. Urmson 
suggests, it appears absurd to consider it a case of conflicting rules (1988, p. 163). 
What rules are supposed to conflict here? ‘Don’t break promises’ is one perhaps. But 
it seems absurd to have a rule, or PFP, in this case, of “showing one’s friends around”, 
or even Hare’s version which tells us “not to betray [our] friends” (1988d, p. 275). If 
this does not convince, remember that for Hare PFP‘s must be quite rigid. We need to 
be strongly disinclined to consider alternatives to these principles when they present 
themselves, or else they lack the emotional significance they are supposed to have for 
us. In addition, if we consider this case a conflict of principles, in Hare’s sense, we 
must necessarily resort to CMT to resolve the conflict. However, as Urmson points 
out, this has the morally deleterious effect of encouraging us to ignore the fact that 
there are all kinds of judgments one might make in cases like the one above that avoid 
the extremes of, on the one hand, arbitrary choice (e.g. simply letting one principle 
override the other for no apparent reason) and, on the other, impartial act-utilitarian 
analysis (1988, p. 165). We might, and most people do, have a principle of not 
betraying our friends. We might even take it to apply in the kind of case described 
above. But such a principle obviously requires much moral judgement for its applica- 
tion. The kind of judgment or weighing of alternatives in such cases is not like Hare’s 
CMT since, as Urmson claims, “there are many relevant considerations [encompassed 
by such a principle], none of them decisive.. . All these considerations have to be 
taken into account, and the general welfare may be one, but only one, of them” (1 988, 
p. 165). Clearly, then, if Hare’s view of moral rules in IMT fails to do justice to the 
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complexity even of rather trivial cases such as this one, it will be woefully inadequate 
for dealing with the complexities and uncertainties of the moral problems raised by 
issues such as AIDS, animal rights, world hunger and overpopulation, or control over 
schooling in multicultural societies. 
The persuasiveness of my argument that Hare’s view oversimplifies moral judg- 
ment depends on an understanding of what Hare means by a PFP (or what I call a 
strong rule). Are these rules as rigid as I have argued? Following Hare, Urmson 
describes principles as relatively simple and general. They are “rules of conduct which 
we set out for ourselves or accept from others to be followed (ordinarily) blindly. By 
blindly I mean I am unwilling to consider arguments to the contrary” (1 988, p. 164). 
They are, within the boundaries of their application, uncritically held. For example, I 
have a principle against interrupting people when they are speaking. Under normal 
circumstances I unreflectively adhere to the rule. It has quite a clear range of 
application. But if someone insults me, or if they tell a blatant lie or if they are about 
to be run down by a car, I break the rule. Whether or not this is a comprehensive 
account of the word ‘principle’, Hare considers this characterization to be quite 
similar to that of his own treatment of PFP’s (1988d, p. 275). 
Urmson also suggests the term ‘adage’ for rules which are more weakly held than 
blind principles. I shall call the former rules of thumb. This is appropriate since they 
seem to be akin to the rules of thumb that Hare contrasts PFP’s to in Moral Thinking 
(p. 38). These are propositions such as ‘Be kind to your friends’. They may serve as 
rough guides for one’s actions. That is, they represent potential reasons, in competi- 
tion with other morally relevant considerations, for considering something morally 
relevant in particular situations. Rules of thumb cannot be considered a “sufficient 
reason [against the performance of certain actions] in all circumstances” (Urmson 
1988, p. 165). Many other reasons for taking alternative actions-some of which 
might be expressed as competing rules of thumb-may exist. Which rule, if any, 
counts as most important, and for what reasons, and what counts as its fulfilment, will 
be determined by particulars. 
A Weak View of Moral Rules Outlined 
What precisely distinguishes rules of thumb from PFP’s? This is an important 
question, since if there is no difference, the moral complexities that rules of thumb are 
supposed to allow for must also be allowed for by PFP’s. My objection to Hare thus 
fails. But there is an important distinction to be made. PFP’s are habitual, mechanistic 
responses. Thus, a rule such as ‘Keep your promises’ is quite straightforward in its 
application. As Charles Larmore points out, if I make a promise to return your book 
today, the only moral consideration here is simply returning the book sometime today. 
Considerations of judgment with rules of this type involve only ‘non-moral’ considera- 
tions such as when today to return the book (Larmore, 1987, p. 5). [2] However, 
principles of courage and friendship involve a multitude of moral alternatives for their 
application, In what way should I honor this principle? What counts as fulfilling the 
principle in a particular case? With what intensity should I pursue this alternative? In 
cases where more than one such principle is open to consideration, the complexity of 
the judging process is compounded. In this sense, such principles act more like rules of 
thumb. That is, they provide only rough general guides for action. 
Hare has recently claimed that his PFP’s actually include what Urmson calls 
‘adages’ or what I call rules of thumb. This new ‘wider’ sense of principle includes 
rules of thumb like “be nice to one’s friends” under “loosely specified conditions” 
(1988d, pp. 275-276). However, such principles, as I have argued, require consider- 
able moral judgment for their application. Hare’s move is to suggest that experience, 
either one’s own or someone else’s, can illuminate some latent determinate method of 
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judgment in the application of such principles. Hare argues from analogy. He suggests 
that, for example, although jurors need to use judgement in evaluating the truthfulness 
of witnesses’ testimony, experienced ones can do so within the framework of a 
‘method’. This kind of thinking “can be rational because there is a way of determin- 
ing, perhaps later, whether a witness was telling the truth. So we can build up an idea 
of whether the intuitive thinking we were doing was methodologically sound.. . What 
makes moral intuitions, when unsupported by critical thinking, irrational is that there 
is no such method” (1988d, p. 277). Therefore, Hare seems to think that, just as 
critical moral thinking can establish a methodology based on a code of moral rules, 
and itself provides a methodology of resolving the rare disputes at the latter level, so 
‘factual’ critical thinking can establish a methodology for factual intuitive thinking. 
Additionally, this kind of critical thinking can itself resolve the rare disputes at the 
level of intuitive factual thinking. However, this is unconvincing. For example, 
whatever rules might be formulated for assessing the veracity of testimony are quite 
obviously going to be rules of thumb. ‘Ignore hyberbolic testimony’ is an excellent 
rule, but clearly it should be completely ignored in some circumstances. I have heard 
of a judge who immediately dismissed a child’s testimony at a sexual assault trial 
when the child answered the question “How often were you molested?’ by saying 
“Millions of times” [3]. To avoid such obtuse judgements, one might say that the rule 
itself should be made more flexible. To do this one could suggest, as Hare might, a rule 
such as “Treat hyperbolic testimony with care” or “Ignore hyperbolic testimony 
(under ‘loosely specified’ conditions)”. However, these clearly are nothing like Hare’s 
strong rules. They require much judgment for their application. Similarly, in the moral 
case, the more the rules of the intuitive level are represented as ‘loosely specified’, the 
less they can be rules which are simply applied by some kind of ‘reaction pattern’. 
Being nice, even to friends, is often not what is morally required of us, but obviously 
there is no determinate methodology available for determining when it is and when it 
is not. 
The preceding discussion suggests that adherence to moral rules is not “the best 
way of characterizing” virtuous character as Hare claims (1988d, p. 279). We normally 
treat rules of thumb as summaries of important truths. Thus, “Too many cooks spoil 
the broth” and “Many hands make light work” (Hare’s examples) reflect insights 
which we recognize from diverse contexts in our actual lives. It would be extremely 
unnatural to suppose that we rely on such insights in any strong way to guide our 
evaluations of particular situations. Artists do not paint in large groups on the grounds 
that ‘Many hands make light work‘. We may, in certain situations, use such adages as 
simplifying devices to represent features of particular situations but we would nor- 
mally attend much more closely to the particular features of particular situations 
before deciding which adage was applicable. Even once we have done this, we think of 
this characterization of the situation as only a sort of summary of a more complex and 
elusive situation which underlies it. Much of moral importance is left out. Similarly 
we cannot superimpose upon the virtues a set of principles, declaring the two identical 
(Hare, 1988d, p. 280). If we do, we find that principles of courage, humility, other- 
regard, etc., involve considerable judgement for their application. We will find that 
considerations of what acts actually count as courageous and with what sort of 
intensity and vigor they might be pursued require judgement of considerable delicacy 
and skill. Such considerations cannot necessarily be characterized, as Hare claims, as 
simply “obedience to a principle or disobedience” (1988d, p. 168) since much more 
needs to be said about the adeptness or ineptitude of the application of the principles. 
Hare’s view seems to make general principles into the tail (and a rather small one at 
that) wagging the substantial dog of judgement [4]. 
My argument so far has been that Hare, given the resources available to him in his 
‘two-level’ theory, has two lines open to him in dealing with the complexity raised by 
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conflicts of moral principles. First, he could simply extirpate judgment altogether at 
the level of IMT. This would require some explanation of how everyday intuitive 
thinking would be a matter of applying a set of internalized, habitual rules or 
principles in such a way that no judgement was required. Given the nature of the 
relatively simple, general principles that constitute one’s ‘moral ammunition’ at the 
intuitive level, this move would make his conception of intuitive thinking quite 
implausible. It becomes implausible because most, if not all, of our principles at this 
level require for their application some conception of judgement, if their application is 
not to be arbitrary. We need some way of determining what counts as a good or bad 
application of such principles. If these arguments are on target then CMT must play a 
much larger role in everyday moral judgment than Hare indicates. 
Critical Moral Thinking: the problems of act-utilitarianism 
Hare seems to recognize this fact when he backpedals, under fire from critics, from his 
earlier claims regarding the primacy of IMT. For example, he has claimed that “moral 
development is a development toward critical thinking” (1 982, p. 3 16). More recently, 
he has said that critical thinking is “the completion of the moral thought begun at the 
intuitive level” (1988c, p. 261). If this claim reflects Hare’s actual position, then 
mature moral agents will, contrary to his claims elsewhere, rely less on rules (which, as 
we have seen, are seriously inadequate anyway) and much more on the method of 
CMT. 
For Hare, CMT is a decision procedure involving a strongly impartial identifica- 
tion with all the relevant preferences obtaining in a particular case. The agent, when 
faced with a moral choice, must ‘fully represent’ to herself all of the preferences of 
those affected by her action. The preferences of the overall greatest intensity deter- 
mine the right choice. Thus the right choice for Hare is equivalent to “situational act- 
utilitarian judgment” based on equal evaluation of preference intensity; but Hare’s 
necessary reliance on CMT raises .a puzzle. Such an egalitarian judgment procedure is 
open to well-known and much rehearsed objections. It allows too strong a role to ‘evil 
desires’ such as those of racists or Nazis; it does not allow a strong enough role for 
intuitive values such as that of loyalty to family and friends. I argue that Hare’s CMT 
is a sitting duck for these kinds of objections. 
First, I will clarify what CMT is. The sharp distinction Hare draws between the 
two levels of moral thinking is based on a theory of the meaning of concepts that are 
typically used in moral discourse. Understanding this theory helps us to understand 
the theoretical basis for CMT. CMT and IMT are levels of substantive moral thinking. 
However, they are established, Hare claims, by inquiry in the area of philosophical 
logic. The clarity of our thinking at these levels is based on our understanding of moral 
concepts. These meanings are established at a third level of thinking-the meta- 
ethical. Here, the logical canons of prescriptivity, universalizability and overridability 
are laid bare to reveal the meaning of evaluative words like ‘ought’. 
For Hare, moral judgements at both the critical and intuitive levels are universal 
prescriptions (1981, p. 41). The difference between the two levels is described as a 
difference in the specificity of the two kinds of principles. Intuitive principles, as we 
have seen, must be of limited specificity; they must be fairly general. This is required 
due to the purposes served by intuitive principles (e.g. they must be used for moral 
education, they must allow us to deal with situations similar in their general moral 
features). Critical principles, while remaining universal, can be of unlimited specifi- 
city. Indeed, Hare says, for their purpose, critical principles “have to be highly 
specific” (1 98 1, p. 41). The differences between principles at the two levels do not stop 
here of course. They also have different purposes. Consider the case of moral conflicts. 
As Hare says, when we are thinking about conflicts between principles at the critical 
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level, “there is a requirement that we resolve the conflict” (198 1, p. 26), but there is no 
such requirement at the intuitive level. Thus, the way we resolve a conflict between 
our principles (e.g. the case of the unexpected friend above) is by doing some hard 
CMT and tailoring a critical principle that accounts for all the relevant, particular 
features of the situation. This principle must necessarily lead to maximum satisfaction 
of preferences. This is the same judgement a “careful act-utilitarian would make” 
(Hare, 1981, p. 43). 
There is a further feature of the logic of the moral concepts which differentiates 
the two levels. This is the property of overridingness. Hare notes that we often may 
continue to hold our PFP’s even if we find ourselves constrained to do the CMT 
leading us to a more specific principle which resolves our moral confict. This leaves us 
with two prescriptions, which may conflict. But surely we are to act on the critical 
principle in this case (assuming we are confident about the competence of our CMT). 
The reason for this is that critical principles are taken as overriding. That is, we may 
make exceptions to intuitive principles. Hare says that this property in fact distin- 
guishes moral evaluative judgements from other evaluative judgements like aesthetic 
ones (1 98 1, p. 52). 
Critical moral principles on this account are prescriptive and universal (i.e. they 
contain no individual constants and are governed by a universal quantifier). In 
addition, they are overriding. If they are sincerely held and the individual is able to act 
upon them and there is no external impediment to acting upon them, they must be 
acted upon if they are to count as the agent’s bona fide moral principles. Hare says 
that PFP’s are also prescriptive and universal, but they can be overriden. However, he 
says, the fact that they can be overriden “does not mean they are not prescriptive; if 
applied, they would require a certain action,but we just do not apply them in a certain 
case” (1981, p. 59). So PFP’s are universal prescriptions, but they are not overriding. 
We will desire to act upon them so long as they are considered morally relevant. Thus 
we can always be inclined to uphold them even in cases where they are overruled by 
competing critical prescriptions. In such cases, if the PFP conflicts with the critical 
principle, the former will be regarded as morally irrelevant in that case (which is not 
the same as simply discarding them at the intuitive level. We can still have the 
intuitive desire to uphold them). Nonetheless, in such cases IMT clearly must give way 
to CMT. 
Hare distinguishes two kinds, or two uses, of CMT. Recall that IMT is necessary 
to take account of what seemed to be certain facts about our everyday moral thinking. 
Our intuitive principles must be selected or tested, or somehow based on, CMT. Thus, 
CMT ushers in two kinds of moral principles. First, the highly specific, universal, 
prescriptive and overriding critical principles. Secondly, more general universally 
prescriptive (but non-overriding) PFP’s. The latter are to be justified by being 
principles “whose general acceptance would lead to people’s actions and dispositions 
approximating to the greatest extent to the deliverances of a perfectly conducted 
critical thinking” (1 98 1, p. 6 1). They have high ‘acceptance-utility’. These two proce- 
dures are the two uses or kinds of CMT. 
I will call the former kind ‘direct CMT’ and the latter kind ‘indirect CMT’. I will 
consider direct CMT first. How is this kind of thinking act-utilitarian? William 
Frankena notes that direct critical thinking ‘‘consists in using the universal prescriptiv- 
ist, act-utilitarian method directly to determine what to do in a particular case” (1 988, 
However, what does it mean to call this method act-utilitarian? For Hare, there is 
a particularly strong requirement of universalizability connected to moral judgements. 
Briefly, if we hold a prescription, which represents a preference of ours, (since, as Hare 
says, to have a preference is to assent to a prescription) and if this is a universal 
prescription, we must “accept the universal application of the prescription; and this 
p. 47). 
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includes its application were we in the other’s position [or in the position of all others 
affected by my action]. So the facts we need to be cognizant of will include facts about 
his [their] positions as it affects him [them] with his [their] preferences . . . ” (1 98 1, p. 
89). For Hare the requirement to universalize moral principles is interpreted in an 
ambitious way. When I put myself in another’s shoes, I must take account of all 
others’ preferences equally. Thus: “It follows from universalizability that if I now say 
that I ought to do [XI to some other person, I am committed to the view that the very 
same thing ought to be done to me, were I in exactly his situation, including having 
the same personal characteristics and in particular the same motivational states” 
(Hare 1981, p. 108). 
This method of representation generates act-utilitarianism since it “involves 
[coming to have] equal motivations [i.e. motivations equal to those of all persons 
affected by our actions], with regard to possible similar situations, were we in them” 
(1 98 1, p. 95). Since we come to have, ourselves, in some way, preferences equal to all 
of those affected by our actions, we are in effect deliberating in the same way that an 
impartial ‘ideal observer’ (198 1 , p. 44) would do. Through an admittedly difficult act 
of imagination, Hare’s theory requires that we treat all the preferences of all those 
affected by an action, including ourselves, equally and impartially. 
Holding a Harean universal principle requires that I come to ‘identify’ with others 
so strongly that I come to feel now (i.e. in my deliberations) their preferences in the 
same way they do, were I in their position, with their personal characteristics. Thus, if 
I have a strong desire to park my car in a driveway currently occupied by X’s bicycle, 
and if X has a weak desire not to move his bike, after full representation of all 
preferences, I find I should move the bike and park my car. However, if X has a very 
strong desire not to move his bike, then I find-after full identification-that I should 
not move the bike. This is act-utilitarian since the preferences of all those affected are 
given equal weight and the strongest preferences are decisive. 
It should be noted here that in cases in which the preferences of many persons are 
concerned, this method does not entail that the most intensely held preferences win 
out. For example, in a society in which a large majority prescribes slavery for a small 
minority the prescription may survive the universalization process. The many prefe- 
rences of the slave owners (though relatively weak) may outweigh the few (though 
intense) preferences of the slaves. Strongest cumulative preferences are maximized. 
CMT and Moral Schizophrenia 
How might Hare respond to objections raised by the example of tyrannical majorities, 
or by the familiar case of the ‘down-and-out’ kidney and heart donor who, act- 
utilitarians must think, ought to be killed against his will in order to save the lives of 
two other people (Hare, 1981, p. 132)? Predictably, his defense depends upon the 
distinction between the two levels of moral thinking. First of all, he says, IMT will 
advocate a prohibition on murder in the form of an intuitive principle. Such a 
principle will have a high acceptance utility. Secondly, we will be very unlikely to have 
good reason to overcome this prohibition in the particular case since it is very unlikely 
that we will be able to compile the information necessary to do competent critical 
thinking and it will be equally unlikely that we will be able to be justifiably confident 
that the information indicating that we ought to kill the ‘down-and-out’ is correct. 
Thus, all things considered, we should always or almost always stick with our 
intuitions. As Hare says, the ‘high degree of probability’ which would be needed in 
connection with the information we gathered (e.g. about the down-and-out’s lack of 
connections, the discretion of all those involved in not revealing that the act has been 
done, etc.) “will not be forthcoming in many actual situations, if any at all” (1981, p. 
133). 
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Hare deals with two further, and more ‘genuine’ (1981, p. 137) examples in a 
similar fashion. The first example considers the common sense moral intuition that we 
should “give. . . [extra] weight to the duties usually thought to exist towards particular 
persons, or to ties of affection or loyalty which bind us to them but not to mankind in 
general” (1 98 1, p. 135). That is, we are usually thought to have special duties to our 
spouses and children, etc. These are stronger than our duties to total strangers. Act- 
utilitarianism seems to require, for example, that parents avoid being partial to the 
needs of their own children. In requiring us to maximize preference satisfaction, and 
in forcing us to treat the preferences of all persons equally, it seems to ignore our 
common intuitions about such relationships. To take a particular case, offered by 
Hare (via Bernard Williams) I am to suppose that I have been “in an air crash and the 
aircraft catches fire, but [I] have managed to get out; in the burning plane are, among 
others, my son and a distinguished surgeon who could, if rescued, save many injured 
passengers’ lives, to say nothing of those whose lives he would save in his subsequent 
career. I have time to rescue only one person” (1 98 1, p. 138). Hare’s first comment is 
that once again, one is unlikely to have enough information, of which one can be 
confident that it is true, to take what is supposed to be the utilitarian’s unflinching 
prescription4.e. save the surgeon, let your son burn! However, even if one did have 
the necessary information, “You have (rightly from the critical utilitarian point of 
view) been brought up to attach dominant importance to these family loyalties” (1 98 1, 
p. 138). Thus, you will probably rescue your son. 
This characterization of the problem raises an important point. The upbringing 
recommends, in such cases, what is the morally wrong action from the critical 
perspective. This seems to be a serious flaw in the theory. Even seeing clearly what the 
right action was from the point of view of my theory, I am likely to do the wrong thing 
from that point of view. That is a seriously schizophrenic result. 
This point strikes at the heart of Hare’s theory and needs to be explained further. 
For Hare, the ‘well-brought up’ individual is, it seems, the morally educated one. This 
means that she is adept at thinking at both moral levels. She knows when it is 
appropriate to ascend to the critical level. She knows also that intuitive thinking is a 
mere concession to human weakness and partiality. Hare might say that it is often 
inappropriate to make the move to critical thinking, because of the urgency of the 
situation and the resulting lack of information and fellow-feeling. In the cases we are 
considering, Hare can allow values like family loyalty and the prohibition on murder 
to prevail. However, upon reflection, the agent must admit that on the whole the 
action was wrong. It is still ‘right’ (i.e. prima facie right) in one sense, as Hare claims. 
But we now see that this sense of right is the relatively feeble sense in which the action 
was the best one could do as an agent who must live by moral standards fitted to 
human frailty and ignorance. Thus, regardless of lacking the ‘leisure’ to perform 
critical calculations in the face of ‘real life stress and urgency’, Hare’s agents must 
adopt a sort of schizophrenic outlook. They must diligently and confidently adhere to 
general rules at the intuitive level; but at the critical level, these same principles must 
be viewed as mere ‘useful fictions’, designed for a benighted humanity. They are 
fictitious because they fabricate a more or less crude substitute for genuine important 
moral truth. This truth, then, is commonly something which is out of the reach of 
humans, but also something for which they should rarely strive. However, this point 
raises the possibility for Hare to take advantage of another response to the objection I 
have raised. He might acknowledge that the ascent to critical thinking does create a 
psychological ‘dissonance’. But since these moments of ascent are so rare, they do not 
create anything like a schizophrenic identity. Moral educators who consider a schizo- 
phrenic identity an educationally reprehensible result, might find psychological disso- 
nance of this weaker type quite tolerable. However, if our moral principles conflict as 
frequently as I have suggested,then it is clear that the rules of IMT are relatively flimsy 
86 K. McDonough 
moral props. For instance, in the case of slavery, the fact that enslavement goes against 
the grain (at the level of IMT) of our moral feelings must be immaterial to our moral 
judgment. 
Hare’s defense so far has consisted in his insisting that counter-utilitarian 
examples ignore the fact that different types of moral thinking are appropriate for 
different times and cases. IMT is for ‘everyday situations’ and CMT is reserved for a 
‘cool hour’. While the judgments at the two levels may exist in tension, they each have 
an appropriate time and place, and thus these judgments never openly or sharply 
conflict. However, given any fairly diverse set of principles, conflicts are bound to 
arise often. Also, our set of principles would need to be fantastically diverse to avoid 
unanticipated moral problems. Hare cannot deny that CMT must at least be at- 
tempted in such cases. In these cases our judgments at the two levels will sharply and 
openly conflict. 
Indirect CMT does nothing to resolve this difficulty. As Frankena notes, the crux 
of the problem for Hare is that he is unable to avoid the objectionable implications of 
what is the ‘fixed point’ of this theory. That is: “the right act to perform in a particular 
situation is the act that one of archangelic powers would pronounce to be so if he 
addressed himself to the question and used [direct CMT] to answer i t .  . . ” (1 988, p. 
48). The unrestrained use of this kind of thinking is, as Hare admits, dangerous and 
morally objectionable (at least for humans). Bernard Williams has also pointed out the 
damaging effects of such thinking to the integrity of moral agents (Williams, 1973, pp. 
108-1 18). If Hare’s PFP’s are to be of any use, they must be strong enough to 
withstand the temptation to use direct CMT. They are uncritical-1.e. they must 
operate, in Williams’ word, as “black box mechanisms” (1 988, p. 190). One remaining 
line of defense for Hare would be to find some middle ground; some insulation, as it 
were, between the two extremes of IMT and direct CMT. 
Hare has suggested a way of interpreting the two levels in such a way that all of 
our moral thinking is actually a combination of IMT and CMT. However, this move, 
rather than resolving the dilemma I have been posing, simply heightens the schizo- 
phrenic implications of Hare’s view. Hare admits that “almost all acts are to some 
degree self-educative”, although some are more so than others. He gives as an example 
of acts which are ‘especially self-educative’, acts involved in adhering to a rule of 
“suffering fools gladly” (1 988a, p. 229). This is a good example for our purposes since 
obviously much judgement would be needed to apply such a principle. This would 
mean, as Hare himself says, that “We should.. . end up applying [direct act-utilitari- 
anism] to pretty well all our acts to some degree. . . ” (1988a, p. 229). The reason for 
this is one I have suggested already. We always, or almost always, have more to learn 
about what counts as or constitutes ‘following’ or ‘obeying’ a simple rule in a particular 
case. Some judgement is needed to tell us which rule is the best one to follow and what 
is the best way of following the rule. 
This also makes clear another important point. The critical thinking involved in 
“direct application of the act-universal prescriptivist, act-utilitarian method to parti- 
cular cases” and the critical thinking involved in “selecting or justifying” our intuitive 
principles seem to occur, in Hare’s view, in the same thought process. Thus, the ‘two 
uses’ of critical thinking may often occur simultaneously. However, it also suggests 
that, at least very often, we are not simply applying intuitive principles in some 
uncritical way, i.e. as ‘black box mechanisms’; rather we are using critical thinking in 
almost all of our acts to (a) ‘cultivate dispositions’ and (b) to calculate the ‘optimal 
consequences’ of the particular act dictated by the principle on a particular occasion. 
Hare says of the above example, “ . . . if we found ourselves not suffering fools gladly, 
we should pull ourselves up both because it led to less than optimal consequences on 
that occasion, and because we were getting into bad habits” (1988a, p. 229). 
This is a revealing example. It clearly shows that insofar as principles cannot be 
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simply followed by ‘habit’, insofar as judgement is required for their application, 
insofar as the acts involved in following the principle are ‘self-educative’, Hare needs 
direct critical thinking to monitor the conduct of the moral agent in a quite pervasive 
way. It seems that his view of the relationship between the intuitive and critical levels 
commits him to the view that rarely do we simply uncritically follow a given principle. 
Rather-at least for Hare-we usually, if not always, need to use critical thinking to 
determine what is morally best. Hare can certainly say: “ . . . we should pull ourselves 
up both because it led to less than optimal consequences on that occasion, and because 
we were getting into bad habits” (1 988, p. 229). But as soon as ‘habit’-conceived as a 
rule-fails us in a particular case, direct critical thinking, and the act-preference 
utilitarian standard, is needed to judge that particular case. Thus, the form of 
schizophrenia inherent in Hare’s theory is particularly severe. We do not adopt critical 
thinking on rare and rather bizarre occasions. Indeed, we are not just required to 
alternate moral personae, one instant rational archangelic strategist, the next mindless 
prole. We are required somehow to adopt both personae at once. Thus, the moral 
educator who educates for competence at both of these levels must necessarily 
encourage the internalization of such schizophrenia in her students. 
Aristotle on Moral Rules and Virtue 
Obviously, the failure of Hare’s theory to account for the complexity of the moral life 
does not compel us to throw up our hands in despair. I hope to argue more fully in a 
future paper that Aristotle provides us with a much more promising picture of moral 
judgment, and of a moral education based on it, but I can give the rough contours of 
such a view here. 
Aristotle’s understanding of moral development exhibits a harmonious relation- 
ship between moral principles and reflective moral judgment that Hare’s view is 
unable to account for. This view avoids the schizophrenic results of Hare’s view. 
Hare’s theory entails that our habitual, trained moral responses can be sufficiently 
characterized in terms of simple general rules. These rules provide determinate 
standards of moral judgment at the intuitive level. When these rules conflict, the rules 
must be altogether abandoned in favour of a new kind of reflective think- 
ing-CMT-and its determinate moral standard of maximal preference satisfaction. 
In spite of the fact that Hare claims that his ‘two-level’ view owes some inspira- 
tion to Aristotle (Hare, 1981, p. 25), Aristotle differs sharply from Hare. A rough 
similarity undoubtedly exists between Hare’s level of IMT-which represents our 
habitual and trained moral responses-and what Aristotle calls the excellences of 
character. Similarly, there is a rough correspondence between Hare’s CMT-which 
represents more reflective moral judgement-and Aristotle’s notion of the excellences 
of intelligence, but the similarities are superficial. Aristotle does not see the excellences 
of character as codifiable. They do not function as mere ‘noble lies’ for the benighted 
masses, as in Plato and Hare. The habitual, ingrained moral responses, products of our 
moral training, are in fact constitutive of our more reflective understanding of the 
good. Unlike Hare, Aristotle recognizes that we can rarely shed our moral ‘habits’ or 
principles, as a snake sheds its skin, when moral conflicts require us to do some 
reflective thinking. 
For Aristotle, our habitual concerns and principles represent for us the vague 
outlines of the moral landscape. Practical wisdom, or phroneszs, is needed to fill in 
more detailed features of the landscape. For Hare, the moral habits we express as rules 
may also be said to paint a hazy and general outline of the moral landscape. But when 
these elements ‘conflict’, one must, as it were, erase the outline and begin again using a 
completely different method (CMT). Alternatively, the Aristotelian view conceives of 
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moral habits as essential tools for ‘composing the scene’ within which our reflective 
judgments will be made. This is not to say that we cannot, and do not often need to, 
refer to our habitual concerns, and to modify our ‘moral outline’ an indefinite number 
of times in doing so. The main point for Aristotle is that our final picture is 
constituted by a reflective consideration of the complex and varied concerns we are 
brought up to pay attention to. For Hare, our final judgments must ignore these 
concerns of character and virtue. Furthermore, just because, following Aristotle, we 
need not adhere to the independent standard of maximizing utility, this does not mean 
that we can adhere to no standards at all. Standards of friendship, regard for family as 
well as for the most disadvantaged, etc., must be weighed against, not subordinated to, 
standards of maximizing overall intensity of preferences. And the sort of ability 
required for making such judgments cannot be characterized in terms of rules. 
Obviously, for educators this conception of virtue has much importance, including the 
importance of teaching with complex, detailed and rich examples, both from life and 
from literature, rather than teaching by precept. I will save this discussion for another 
occasion. 
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NOTES 
[ l ]  Hare does allow that in some very simple cases of intuitive thinking “we may ‘feel sure’ that some 
principle or some feature of a situation is in that situation more important than others. . . We shall then 
be able to sort the matter out intuitively, letting one principle override the other in this case, without 
recourse to critical thinking” (1981, p. SO), but any intuitive choice between principles makes sense only 
insofar as it converges with ‘critical’ judgment. 
Even here actual cases are rarely this simple. I could fulfil the promise by ringing your doorbell at 1 1:59 
pm.,  when I know you are asleep and must wake up early the next morning for an important job 
interview. Such alternatives will obviously be ruled out by virtuous agents. So even straightforward rules 
are apt to engage judgment in this minimal way. 
I owe this example to Eamonn Callan. 
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